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Interested Party VALERIE DUNCKER and  
Responsible Individual SEYMOUR DUNCKER

**UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT**  
**NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**  
**SAN JOSE DIVISION**

In re

iCHARTS, INC.,

Debtor.

Case No. 18-50958 MEH  
Chapter 7  
Hon. M. Elaine Hammond

**REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR  
CLARIFICATION OF ORDER  
OVERRULING OBJECTION TO FEE  
APPLICATIONS [DKT NO. 58]**

**Date:** July 30, 2020  
**Time:** 10:30 a.m.  
**Place:** via Tele/Videoconference

Seymour Duncker, Debtor iCharts, Inc.'s ("iCharts") responsible individual and sole remaining director of iCharts, Inc. as of the petition date, and interested party Valerie Duncker (together, the "Movants"), submit this reply in support of their Motion for Clarification [See Dkt. No. 63] (the "Motion") and in response to the Trustee's Comments to Motion to Reconsider [See Dkt. No. 67] (the "Response"). The Movants respectfully represent as follows:

**I. INTRODUCTION**

The Motion seeks narrow and straight-forward relief to clarify an ambiguity as to whether

1 certain assets have, or have not, been administered herein.<sup>1</sup> It is currently unclear from the Trustee's  
2 Final Report ("TFR") whether eight patents listed in the Debtor's schedules at the outset of the case  
3 were actually administered herein.<sup>2</sup> On the one hand, the Trustee's Report of Sale [See Dkt. No.  
4 45], referenced in the TFR's Entry number 9, only discloses the sale of certain "Source Code", and  
5 the record does not otherwise reflect the sale, liquidation, or administration of the Eight Patents or  
6 any other liquidation of assets whatsoever in this case.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, the TFR inconsistently  
7 reports that all assets, including purportedly the eight patents, were "fully administered" (*i.e.*, sold or  
8 liquidated) herein, and that no property of the estate is being formally abandoned.<sup>4</sup> As stated in the  
9 Motion, the Movants do not seek any modification to the Court's order beyond a clarification of this  
10 ambiguity: ***whether or not certain patents have been administered herein.***<sup>5</sup> Such clarification will  
11 ensure that all property will be found to either have been administered or properly and automatically  
12 "flushed out" of the bankruptcy estate and revested in iCharts post-bankruptcy, pursuant to  
13  
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15 <sup>1</sup> Although no definition of the operative term "administered" appears anywhere in the Bankruptcy  
16 Code or the Bankruptcy Rules, it has been understood as liquidation with respect to assets. *See, e.g.*,  
17 *In re NSCO, Inc.*, 427 B.R. 165, 181 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010) (full administration requires that "the  
assets available for liquidation must be liquidated and the obligations of the estate paid in  
accordance with the Bankruptcy Code[.]").

18 <sup>2</sup> *See* Voluntary Petition, Schedule A/B: Assets – Real and Personal Property, Part 10 (Intangibles  
19 and intellectual property), section 60, listing, among other things, "**8 patents**". [See Dkt. No. 1, page  
13 of 103].

20 <sup>3</sup> The Movants request that the Court may take judicial notice of the documents filed in this case  
21 pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9017 and Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b)(2) and  
22 the fact that, other than the Trustee's Report of Sale of the Source Code, no other report of sale,  
assignment, or disposition of any other assets of the estate was filed herein and that the eight patents  
at issue were not administered (*i.e.*, liquidated) herein.

23 <sup>4</sup> *See* Entry number 9 in Form 1 – Individual Estate Property Record and Report, Asset Cases –  
24 reports that "**8 patents and computer code**" have been "**fully administered**" and assigns no gross  
value to any remaining assets. [See Dkt. No. 50, page 3 of 15]. However, only the computer code,  
25 *not the Eight Patents*, were administered pursuant to the order authorizing compromise and purchase  
of source code [See Dkt. No. 44], as reported in the Trustee's Report of Sale [See Dkt. No. 45] and  
26 acknowledged in the references cited in entry number 9. [See *id.*].

27 <sup>5</sup> Specifically, patents, applications and continuations, bearing numbers: (1) US8,271,892; (2)  
US8,661,358; (3) US8,520,000; (4) US9,270,728; (5) US9,716,741; (6) US9,712,595; (7)  
28 US9,979,758; and (8) US9,665,654, 14/629,309, 14/629,349, 15/717,590, 15/717,601 (collectively  
with all applications and continuations, the "Eight Patents"). [See Dkt. No. 56, page 7 of 7].

1 Bankruptcy Code section 554(c).<sup>6</sup>

2 In response to the non-controversial relief sought by the Motion, the Trustee doubles down  
3 that he “has fully administered all scheduled assets in the debtor’s estate” [Response, p. 1],  
4 including, purportedly, the eight scheduled patents.<sup>7</sup> He evades the fundamental and material  
5 ambiguity raised by the Motion: *who do the Eight Patents belong to?* There are only two possible  
6 answers, depending on whether or not the patents were administered (*i.e.*, liquidated) herein:

- 7       ▪ If, as the Trustee contends, he has “fully administered all scheduled assets”,  
8             including, by implication, the eight scheduled patents, then that logically means that  
9             the patents must have been included in the sale of assets to Mr. Seymour Duncker,<sup>8</sup>  
10            because that transaction was the only disposition of assets in this case.
- 11       ▪ If, on the other hand, the patents were not administered (*i.e.*, liquidated) herein, then  
12             they will automatically revert in the debtor iCharts, Inc. post-closing of the  
13             bankruptcy case pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 554(c).

14  
15 Movants simply seek that the Court resolve the foregoing ambiguity so the estate can be fully and  
16 unambiguously administered and so it is clear who the patents belong to.

17 **II. THE COURT HAS INHERENT AUTHORITY TO CLARIFY ITS ORDER *SUA***  
18 ***SPONTE*, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE MOVANTS’ STANDING**

19 The Trustee’s Response obfuscates the simple issue by retorting that the Movants lack  
20 standing. In the first instance, this “lack of standing” argument is unavailing given that this Court  
21 has inherent authority to clarify its Order [Dkt. No. 58]. So as to ensure the orderly administration  
22 of the estate under established Ninth Circuit precedent, bankruptcy courts, as courts of equity, have

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24 <sup>6</sup> *In re: Concepts Plus, LLC*, 549 B.R. 829, 832-835 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2016) (granting motion for  
25 abandonment to the extent it sought a declaration that a judgment was constructively abandoned to  
the Debtor under § 554(c)).

26 <sup>7</sup> See Voluntary Petition, Schedule A/B: Assets – Real and Personal Property, Part 10 (Intangibles  
and intellectual property), section 60, listing “**8 patents**”. [See Dkt. No. 1, page 13 of 103].

27 <sup>8</sup> See Order Authorizing Settlement and Purchase of Source Code [Dkt. No. 44], as reported in the  
28 Trustee’s Report of Sale [Dkt. No. 45] and acknowledged in the references cited in entry number 9.  
[See *id.*].

1 inherent power and authority under 11 U.S.C. section 105(a), independent of any authority under  
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), *sua sponte* to reconsider, modify or vacate orders it previously entered. *See*  
3 *Meyer v. Lenox (In re Lenox)*, 902 F.2d 737, 740 (9th Cir.1990) (citing *Chinichian v. Campolongo*  
4 *(In re Chinichian)*, 784 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir.1986) (Rule 60(b) compliments the discretionary  
5 power that bankruptcy courts have as courts of equity “to reconsider, modify or vacate their previous  
6 orders so long as no intervening rights have become vested in reliance on the orders.”). Thus, it is  
7 unnecessary for the Court to even consider the question of standing for it to clarify the ambiguity  
8 raised in the Motion and to find either that:

9 (a) the patents were not administered herein, and thus they will revert to  
10 iCharts, Inc. upon the closing of this case;<sup>9</sup> or

11 (b) as the Trustee contends, the patents were administered pursuant to the sale  
12 of assets to Mr. Duncker, and they therefore already belong to Mr. Duncker.

13 The clarification of this narrow question will enable either Mr. Duncker or iCharts’s (or its  
14 assignee), as the case may be, to fully exploit the patent monopoly post-bankruptcy, without a  
15 potential cloud over the ownership of the patents and the right to exclude others from their use, in  
16 accordance with long-established applicable non-bankruptcy law and important public policy. *See*  
17 *Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell*, 229 U.S. 1, 8, 33 S.Ct. 616, 619 (1913) (patentee receives the right to  
18 exclude trespass by others; this grant “consists altogether in the right to exclude everyone from  
19 making, using, or vending the thing patented.”); *U.S. v. Vehicular Parking*, 54 F. Supp. 828, 835 (D.  
20 Del.), *modified sub nom. U.S. v. Vehicular Parking Ltd.*, 56 F. Supp. 297 (D. Del. 1944), and  
21 *modified*, 61 F. Supp. 656 (D. Del. 1945) (“The grant of a patent is the grant of a special privilege  
22 ‘to promote the Progress of Science and useful arts.’ Const., Art. I, Sec. 8. It carries, of course, a  
23 right to be free from competition in the practice of the invention.”); *Waco-Porter Corp. v. Tubular*  
24 *Structures Corp. of Am.*, 222 F. Supp. 332, 336 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (“The grant to the inventor of the  
25 special privilege of a patent monopoly carries out a public policy adopted by the Constitution and  
26 \_\_\_\_\_

27 <sup>9</sup> *See* 11 U.S.C. section 554(c); *see also In re Pilz Compact Disc, Inc.*, 229 B.R. 630, 638 (Bankr.  
28 E.D. Pa. 1999) (“Abandonment under Code § 554 removes property from the bankruptcy estate and  
returns the property to the debtor as though no bankruptcy occurred.”).

1 laws of the United States, ‘to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for  
2 limited Times to \* \* \* Inventors the exclusive Right \* \* \*’ to their ‘new and useful’ inventions.  
3 United States Constitution, Art. I[.]”).

4 **III. BOTH MR. DUNCKER AND MS. DUNCKER HAVE STANDING TO APPEAR AND**  
5 **BE HEARD AS “PARTIES IN INTEREST”**

6 If the Court is inclined to consider the question of standing, it is clear under a long line of  
7 precedent that both Mr. Duncker and Ms. Duncker are “parties in interest” under Bankruptcy Code  
8 section 1109(b) with standing to appear and be heard herein even though they may not appear as  
9 “creditors” listed in the “Claims register”. [See Response, p. 1.] While the Bankruptcy Code  
10 provides the identifier “party in interest” as to who may be heard in a particular bankruptcy case, its  
11 list of examples is not exhaustive and not formulaically limited to creditors who file proofs of claim  
12 or even creditors, generally – in fact, the circumstances of each bankruptcy case determine who  
13 qualifies as “party in interest,” with standing to appear and be heard. *See In re Amatex Corp.*, 755  
14 F.2d 1034, 1042 (3d Cir.1985) (the basic test under section 1109(b) is “whether the prospective  
15 party in interest has a sufficient stake in the outcome of the proceeding so as to require  
16 representation.”); *In re Torrez*, 132 B.R. 924, 934 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1991) (entities listed in statute  
17 governing right of party in interest to be heard on any issue in case are not the only parties in interest  
18 that may appear and be heard under the statute; test to determine whether entity is “party in interest”  
19 is whether prospective party in interest has “sufficient stake in the outcome of the proceeding so as  
20 to require representation”). Notably, the “party in interest” standard has generally been construed  
21 broadly, and a party denied standing in the bankruptcy court has appellate standing to challenge that  
22 determination. *See, e.g., In re Thorpe Insulation Co.*, 677 F.3d 869, 884 (9th Cir. 2012); *see also In*  
23 *re Global Indus. Tech, Inc. (In re GIT)*, 645 F.3d 201, 209 n. 23 (3rd Cir.2011) (en banc).

24 **A. Mr. Duncker Has Standing, as the Debtor’s Representative, Because iCharts**  
25 **Has Reversionary Interest in the Patents and Therefore a Sufficient Stake in the**  
26 **Outcome of the Motion.**

27 Because he was the only director as of the petition date, Mr. Duncker is slated to become the  
28 debtor’s sole representative post-bankruptcy. Debtor iCharts, to whom the patents are slated to  
automatically revert to the extent they were not administered (i.e., liquidated) herein, certainly has a  
“sufficient stake” in the outcome of this Motion with respect to its contingent interest in the patents

1 so as to require representation, particularly when the Trustee is claiming that the patents were in fact  
2 administered – Mr. Duncker, as iCharts’ sole remaining director, is therefore a “party in interest”  
3 with standing. *See In re Koch*, 229 B.R. 78, 81-82 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999) (NBA, though not a  
4 creditor or party explicitly listed in section 1109, was an interested party with standing because it  
5 had an “actual, direct interest in this bankruptcy case inasmuch as it claimed to be the owner of  
6 property which the debtor claimed belonged to his bankruptcy estate”).<sup>10</sup> Therefore, the debtor  
7 iCharts, through Mr. Duncker, has standing to appear and be heard, not as a “disappointed  
8 prospective purchaser”, but with respect to the entity’s reversionary interest in the patents, post-  
9 closing of the bankruptcy case. *See In re Wells*, 227 B.R. 553 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998) (would-be  
10 purchaser of real property from chapter 11 debtor had “direct legal and pecuniary interest in  
11 outcome of debtor’s bankruptcy case and, thus, was “party in interest” with standing to file motion  
12 to dismiss”, where dismissal of case would allow would-be purchaser to execute upon any state-  
13 court judgment obtained against debtor).

14 Even under the Trustee’s cited case law, the debtor, through its representative, has standing  
15 because the ambiguity with respect to the patents – whether or not they will revert to its possession –  
16 demonstrably “diminishes the person’s property, increases the person’s burdens, or impairs the  
17 person’s rights.” *See In re Cult Awareness Network, Inc.*, 151 F. 3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing  
18 *In re DuPage Boilerworks, Inc.*, 965 F.2d 296, 297 (7th Cir. 1992) and *In re Andreuccetti*, 975 F.  
19 2d. 413, 416 (7th Cir. 1992).

20 **B. Ms. Duncker Has Standing Because She Was a Creditor with a Claim on the**  
21 **Petition Date, as Reflected in the Debtor’s Schedule E/F.**

22 Ms. Duncker is also a “party in interest” with standing to appear and be heard because she  
23 was listed as an unsecured creditor with a claim of \$9,200 in iCharts’s Schedule E/F, irrespective of  
24 her current status as a creditor in the Claims registry. [See Dkt. No. 1, page 52 of 103.] Under a  
25 long line of authority, Ms. Duncker, as a scheduled creditor in iCharts’s petition, remains a party-in-

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26  
27 <sup>10</sup> Alternatively, Mr. Duncker may also intervene on behalf of iCharts pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule  
28 2018(a). Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2018(a) (“In a case under the Code, after hearing on such notice as the  
court directs and for cause shown, the court may permit any interested entity to intervene generally  
or with respect to any specified matter.”).

1 interest with standing to “appear and be heard” on any issue related to the case. *See In re Marshall*,  
2 298 B.R. 670, 675 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2003) (“A scheduled creditor who has failed to file a proof of  
3 claim remains a ‘party in interest’ with standing.”); *see also In re Stamford Color Photo, Inc.*, 105  
4 B.R. 204, 206–207 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989) (holder of unsecured claim, scheduled as disputed and  
5 contingent who failed to file timely proof of claim, is not entitled to share in distribution but  
6 nonetheless enjoys § 1112(b) standing as “creditor” with “right to payment”); *In re Welwood Corp.*,  
7 60 B.R. 319, 321 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986) (holder of disputed claim was “creditor,” as defined in §  
8 101(9)(A), entitled to request § 1112(b) dismissal).

9 **IV. THE TRUSTEE SHOULD SUPPORT THE REQUESTED RELIEF, NOT RAISE A**  
10 **PURPORTED LACK OF STANDING HURDLE**

11 Finally, Movants submit that the Trustee should support, and not oppose, the requested  
12 relief, because it seeks to remove ambiguity from his final report. The Handbook for Chapter 7  
13 Trustees, setting forth a statement of operational policy for chapter 7 trustees provides guidelines for  
14 how a trustee should proceed in abandoning property of the estate, stating, in the pertinent part, that:

15 Creditors are entitled to notice of a proposed abandonment. A notice of  
16 abandonment *should identify each asset to be abandoned by reference to*  
17 *the description provided in the debtor's schedules* and any unlisted assets  
18 should be clearly described. The notice *should also provide such*  
19 *additional information as is needed to demonstrate the basis upon which*  
20 *the decision to abandon was made*, such as: the amount of secured claims  
21 exceeds the value of the asset; *the costs of recovering and/or liquidating*  
22 *the asset are estimated to exceed its value to the estate*; the expenses of  
23 preserving the asset are estimated to exceed its value to the estate; and any  
24 other information that would assist creditors in evaluating the proposed  
25 action of the trustee.<sup>11</sup>

26 The TFR herein did not comport with the operational policy, as evidenced by the ambiguity with  
27 respect to the administration or non-administration of the Eight Patents. Courts have refused to  
28 approve a chapter 7 trustee's final accounting, absent further correction or clarification, where, as  
here, it contains material ambiguities. *See In re Stephenson*, 415 B.R. 436, 444-45 (Bankr. D. Idaho  
2009) (“There is a material and significant factual issue presented by Trustee’s submissions. ...

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11 Handbook for Chapter 7 Trustees, Chapter 8 (Administration of the Estate), Section D  
(Abandonments), <https://www.justice.gov/ust/handbook-chapter-7-trustees> (emphases supplied).



1 [T]he Final Accounting cannot be approved in the absence of a corrected, and legally adequate,  
2 record reconciling the differences and explaining this situation.”).

3 **V. CONCLUSION**

4 Based on the foregoing, Movants respectfully request that the Court issue an order finding  
5 either that (i) the Eight Patents were not administered (*i.e.*, liquidated) herein and are slated to be  
6 abandoned and revert to the debtor upon the closing of the bankruptcy case pursuant to Bankruptcy  
7 Code section 554(c); or (ii) they were in fact administered and sold to Mr. Seymour Duncker, as part  
8 of the only transaction/liquidation that was completed in this case.

9  
10 DATED: JULY 29, 2020

NASSIRI & JUNG LLP

11 By: /s/ Jose Raul Alcantar Villagran

12 Jose Raul Alcantar Villagran

13 Attorneys for Interested Party VALERIE DUNCKER  
14 and Responsible Individual SEYMOUR DUNCKER  
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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

On the date of execution hereof I served a copy of the following documents:

- **REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF ORDER  
OVERRULING OBJECTION TO FEE APPLICATIONS [DKT NO. 58]**

via Bankruptcy Court's Notice of Electronic Filing, on:

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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on July 29, 2020 at San  
Francisco, California

  
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CLIVE TAN